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A.: Wrongful Death--Liability of Husband if Wife Sole Beneficiary
CASE COMMENTS
rabee, 62 Conn. 393, 26 At. 482 (1892). As was said in Walker v.
Parker,13 Pet. 166 (U.S. 1839), every reasonable construction in the
will must be made in favor of the heir at law; an heir can only be
disinherited by clear and express terms.
In Jackson's Appeal, 126 Pa. 105, 17 Atl. 535 (1899), where the
wife died without electing to take under the will, the court denied
her the right to the intestate property, reasoning that since she
did not elect she must be presumed to have taken under the will,
and as to her there was no intestacy of any portion. Although this
case was not cited, our court intimates by its opinion that a similar
argument was proposed, which in effect would leave the surviving
husband without any right as to intestate property. In Cain v.
Barnell, 124 Miss. 860, 87 So. 484 (1921) where the survivor did
renounce, the court held such a renunciation statute applies only
to property devised and bequeathed under the will, and does not
limit the survivor's right to inherit property not disposed of by the
will. It is submitted that any other result would be punitive and
unjustified.
If there is a conflict in the statutes, there is nothing in the
statutes themselves which would indicate that one should prevail
over the other in such event, nor any provision that if the spouse
take under the will, he will be barred from sharing in intestate
property. When the statutes are doubtful, they ought to be interpreted to reach a result most consonant to equity. In the light
thereof, the legislature, it seems, would not capriciously nullify such
a basic right of inheritance without distinct specification of their
intent to do so.
It would seem that our court was correct in its holding that a
surviving spouse who is paramount heir takes the intestate property
under the statutes of inheritance; and, that this basic and fundamental right is not to be defeated by other statutes dealing with
renunciation and intention of the testator, unless such statutes
clearly state otherwise.
B. A. G.

WRONGFUL D-ATH-LiABILiTy OF HUSBAND IF WIFE SOLE BENE-

FICIARY.-Action by P as administrator of deceased for wrongful
death caused by D's negligence. D, the son-in-law of deceased,
claims that any recovery would go to his wife, as sole beneficiary
of the deceased's estate, and that the action is in reality one by a
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wife against her husband which is contrary to the public policy of
West Virginia. Held, that a cause of action for wrongful death,
being created by statute and given only to the personal representative of the deceased, does not accrue to the beneficiary of the estate,
and therefore, the action is not one brought by a wife against her
husband. Morgan v. Lueck, 72 S.E.2d 825 (W. Va. 1952).
The dissenting judge stated that the action was really one by
a wife against her husband, as the administrator was merely a
formal party suing on behalf of the wife.
At common law, no right of action existed for damages for.
death by wrongful act. The right was first created by an English
statute known as Lord Campbell's Act in 1846. West Virginia's
first wrongful death statute had the same purpose and effect as the
English statute, providing for the amount recovered to be for the
exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin. The express purpose was to compensate such persorrs as were pecuniarily injured
by the death caused by the wrongful act. In 1882, the statute was
amended to give any recovery to the next of kin by omitting the
word "widow", distribution to be made according to the statute
of distribution. The pertinent portion of the act as it appears
today, W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 7, § 5 (Michie, 1949) reads as follows:
"Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would
(if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in
every case, the person who . . . would have been liable if death
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured,..."
In the present case, the deceased, had he survived his injury,
would have been entitled to manitain an action against his son-inlaw; so it would seem that the administrator should be able to sue.
The court said that not to permit him to do so would in effect
"disregard the plain terms of Code, 55-7-5, as amended." However,
in Swope v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 78 W. Va. 517, 89 S.E. 284
(1916), the negligence of the sole beneficiary in permitting his
eleven-year old son to work in a coal mine barred recovery by the
administrator under the death statute, even though, had the son
survived, he could have recovered for the injury. The court there
recognized that such an interpretation was a departure from the
letter of the statute, but it justified its departure by adhering to
the spirit and intent of the statute and interpolating an exception
by implication. See Dickinson v. Colliery Co., 71 W. Va. 325, 76
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S.E. 654 (1912). The court in the Swope case seems to have applied
the venerable maxim, cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex (with
the reason of law ceasing, the law itself ceases). Did the reason for
the law cease in the principal case?
Here, any recovery by the administrator would go to the defendant's wife. It has been long the policy of this state and of the
common law to prohibit tort actions between spouses. To allow
such actions for personal injuries would, it is claimed, impair and
disturb the tranquility of marital felicity. Poling v. Poling, 116
W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935). The same rule was the basis for
preventing an unemancipated child from suing his parent for
injury caused by the parent's negligence. Securo v. Securo, 101
W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931).
In Fetty v. Carroll, 118 W. Va. 401, 190 S.E. 683 (1937), the
court held that the death act is for the exclusive benefit of the
decedent's next of kin, and while the decedent's administrator
alone may sue, his relation to any recovery is not that of decedent's
representative, but that of trustee for the next of kin. "The action
is founded on mere justice and conscience, is in the nature of a bill
in equity, and consequently, is subject to any defense which in
equity and good conscience would preclude a recovery." As was
explained in that case, the administrator has the right of action only
for the benefit of the distributees and any defense good against them
should be good against him. It is left to the reader to determine
whether the fact that the sole beneficiary was the wife of defendant
would be a defense in equity and good conscience.
The existence of beneficiaries is a requisite to the right to sue
under the death statute, and any release or compromise by the
beneficiaries, prior to the action, bars any recovery by the administrator. In view of this and the holding in B. & O.R.R. Co. v. Evans,
188 Fed. 6 (3d Cir. 1911), where the court, in interpreting the
West Virginia statute, said the administrator was a mere formal
party suing on behalf of the real parties in interest, the court in the
instant case appears to be permitting the wife to do indirectly that
which she is precluded by public policy from doing directly; this
being in essence an action by the wife against her husband.
J. L. A.

WRONGFUL DEATH-LIABILITY OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIvE FOR

CosTs.-D, administrator, brought separate actions for the wrongful
death of his two decedents, under W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 7, §§ 5, 6
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